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FORUM 
An Operation called compari-





It might perhaps be going too far to suggest that it is part of the human condition, but in our daily 
actions and observations we cannot help but compare and contrast. Walter Benjamin’s funny ob-
servation is to the point: in winter we usually notice people who are thin; in contrast, in the sum-
mer it’s fat individuals who attract our attention. If this is true, then that we can’t help comparing 
and contrasting. The next questions for those concerned with intellectual and disciplinary matters 
is, of course: How qualified are our observations and conceptualizations? What exactly should be 
compared and contrasted? How explicit do comparisons have to be? 
Comparisons go back a long time; Plato and his distinctions of different forms of rule and govern-
ments, for example, and Herodotus and Thucydides from classic history writing immediately come 
to mind, although there are many others. At the beginning of modern times, Montesquieu and Jon-
athan Swift made deeper inroads into the multiple uses and meanings of comparisons, to great 
effect. In his Persian Letters (1721), Montesquieu famously invented a dramatis persona, Usbek, 
who held up a mirror to what was supposed to be the more advanced society (France). Swift, in his 
distinctively satirist style, famously used Gulliver’s travels (1726/1735) to imaginary places to show 
differences and similarities between peoples, tribes and nations. These early studies show that one 
could travel either horizontally in terms of space to identify differences or commonalities – as was 
the case of Montesquieu in his Persian Letters or the Spirit of the Laws (1748) and Swift’s dystopi-
an novel – or vertically in time, as Rousseau did after Montesquieu when he drew on the distinc-
tion between natural and civilized men in his Discourse on the Origins and Basis of Inequality 
among Men (1755). 
Alexis de Tocqueville and Gustave de Beaumont wrote the first modern works of systematic com-
parison to which the attribute ‘sociological’ can be applied. Actually they almost qualify as a mini 
department of comparative sociology. Their comparisons move constantly between France, the US, 
the UK (in which they include Ireland), Switzerland and Germany. For better or worse, this includ-
ed also the comparative analysis of colonial entities and relations such as India (in the case of the 
UK) and Algeria (in the case of France). In their analyses, Tocqueville and Beaumont tried to ad-
dress the whole package: culture, religion, politics and social conditions. It is perhaps worth point-
ing out how Tocqueville saw his approach. He regarded Democracy in America (1835/1840) as 
part of a comparative study in the development of modern democracy rather than a study of Amer-
ica per se. The United States, having been the first modern democracy, simply provided the con-
crete background for such a study. In this context, it is also revealing that Tocqueville wrote the 
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book with a principally French and European audience in mind. (That he would later become one 
of the honorary intellectual American Founding Fathers is indeed an historic irony that in itself is 
worth a comparative study.) 
As any reader of Democracy will note, the comparisons in it are often, though nor exclusively, im-
plicit. For example, when Tocqueville talks about the Sovereignty of the People, he has another 
contrasting model in mind; the Westminster model of the Sovereignty of the Parliament. On other 
occasions, his comparisons are explicit.  
Tocqueville’s companion Gustave de Beaumont, who wrote a less well-known book about Ireland, 
also used explicit and implicit comparisons contrasting English conditions with those in Ireland. 
Ireland, in turn, provides a further contrast with conditions in America. Ireland in the nineteenth 
century gave little reason for hope, in stark contrast to the U.S. In a way, L’Irlande (1839) can be 
read as the description of a darker side, omitted, oppressed or neglected in both Democracy in 
America and democracy in general. It is a model for comparing like with unlike, as opposed to like 
with like. Having said that, most of what was left out during the birth pangs of modern democracy 
was only hinted at in Beaumont’s work; the differences have to be teased out by the attentive read-
er. For example, even if one only takes a brief look at the table of contents of L’Irlande, one finds 
that the Irish study is apparently structured after Tocqueville’s Democracy. This was, of course, not 
accidental. 
As many commentators have pointed out, Tocqueville and Beaumont’s studies stood in the tradi-
tion of nineteenth century political economy. It is sometimes forgotten that Mill and Nassau Sr. 
were friends of Tocqueville and Beaumont. However, while Tocqueville’s and Beaumont’s approach 
also includes political economy, it is not limited to it. Their studies have become modern classics 
because their work also contained discussions and topics that clearly transcended political econo-
my. Religion, long-term ‘habits of the heart’, civilization, language and other important cultural 
distinctions enriched their analyses. Some of that openness was later narrowed-down as political 
economy, becoming more ‘scientific’, utilitarian and rigid in its approach. In this sense, even 
Marx’s critique of political economy is bifurcated in its analysis. Indeed, ‘critique of political econ-
omy’ does have a double meaning. It can mean, either, that one is critical, or a critic, of political 
economy and wants to criticize and perhaps replace it with a better approach, or that one stands 
firmly in that tradition of using political economy as a theoretical and conceptual tool, albeit per-
haps not wholly uncritically.  
Famously, the subtitle of Das Kapital (1867) was ‘a critique of political economy’. Consequently 
one finds Marx constantly moving between the two viewpoints mentioned. Marx talks of ‘capital’, 
‘labour’, ‘labour power’, ‘surplus’, ‘production’ etc.. At the same time, he attempts to look at what 
lurks behind those allegedly economic terms. By doing this, Marx moves with great ease around the 
globe, making comparisons and highlighting distinctions. Yet, in the end he becomes trapped in his 
own attempt to outwit political economy and trying to enlighten us about the hidden semantics of 
certain ‘economic’ terms. Logically, then, his comparison soon begins to serve only one cause – to 
define how modern capitalism has emerged and has conquered the world with everything else be-
coming subservient to that notion. The end product is a strange ‘nostrification’ process whereby the 
leading and most developed capitalist countries – in Marx’s case first England later the U.S. – show 
their less developed and poorer relations their future. Countries and regions, even entire conti-
nents, are now inhabited by people without history whose only task is to function as predecessors 
to the capitalist regime. (Such systems thinking would later re-emerge in Wallerstein’s world sys-
tem theory, to no great intellectual benefit and distinction it must be said). 
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Comparison served an altogether different purpose for Weber and Durkheim. Max Weber was per-
haps the first to point out that sociological concepts were almost designed to contain comparative 
and general elements. It was not by chance that, epistemologically speaking, Weber emerged out of 
the neo-Kantian tradition; there is no perceivable world and no meaning without concepts. Terms 
such as ‘class’, ‘lifestyle’, ‘bureaucracy’ or ‘charisma’ are abstractions (ideal types in Weber’s lan-
guage) and, precisely because of that very quality, help distinguish certain common characteristics 
and properties of observable phenomena from any other (Economy and Society, 1922). This at-
tempt to make sense puts nomothetic sociology in opposition to other academic undertakings, par-
ticularly history which, at least in its origins, was more idiographic and attempted to explain singu-
larities and single events (hence Ranke and hence historicism and the critique directed against 
them). In the course of the development of both disciplines, such extreme juxtaposition was later 
relativised, in some cases to great effect. Today, social and cultural history would be poorer without 
Weber’s coinages and sophisticated conceptual reflections. 
In the case of Durkheim and the Durkheimians (and most of social anthropology in its wake), we 
probably encounter the most productive use of the modern comparative method. For Durkheim, 
comparison helped identify ‘social facts’. Over time his own use of the comparative method became 
more differentiated. One can clearly distinguish between Durkheim’s early, and rather simplistic, 
use in The Division of Labour in Society (1893) and a later, much more sophisticated approach in 
the Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912). In the early work, he contrasts the simple division 
of labour in primitive societies (and, as a consequence, a mechanic form of solidarity) with a mod-
ern society, which was based on a complex division of labour (and what Durkheim termed organic 
solidarity). In the later, he tried to master (mainly with the help of Marcel Mauss) an array of phe-
nomena, resulting in a number of shorter ‘thick descriptions’ of cultures, tribes, groups and socie-
ties and their social practices. 
It is interesting that Durkheim’s comparisons are located on both horizontal and vertical axes, and 
that they are both applied to space and time. If one had to choose only one outstanding example of 
how successful Durkheim’s comparative method worked, and how rich and insightful his conceptu-
al coinage turned out to be, it would have to be the crucial distinction between ‘sacred’ and ‘pro-
fane’. Durkheim moves back and forth in time and space to reveal deeper, multiple meanings of the 
sacred/profane distinction. Perhaps the most notable feature of Durkheim’s method of comparison 
is that we come to know the deeper meaning of the word and its social and cultural notions and 
functions at the end of the study; we do not know it at the beginning. In this he differs considerably 
from Max Weber, who has been accused of a degree of conceptual imperialism; i.e. using concepts 
that are beyond space and time and so ‘travel light’ and can be applied to all times and circum-
stances but yet miss some crucial features because of their abstractness. 
Not even the shortest meditation about what comparison in sociology or cultural history entails can 
be complete without mentioning a modern classic that, like no other study, has the advantage of 
permitting a look into the engine room of the social scientist who relies on comparisons: Levi-
Strauss’ Tristes Tropiques (1955). As is well known, Levi-Strauss’s work would be unthinkable 
without Durkheim and the Durkheimians (even though Rousseau was his real hero). For our con-
text, it is not important whether we regard Levi-Strauss’ own structural anthropology as having 
been successful or having stood the test of time. What is important is that in TT Levi-Strauss raises 
some of the most pertinent questions about what it means when we study another culture or coun-
try. He points out the mediating and Jeremiad-type role that the social scientist, and in particular 
the social anthropologist, plays. Neither at home in their home country, which s/he often despises, 
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nor fully integrated in the culture they are studying, the social anthropologist is left in a precarious 
position which s/he constantly has to try to balance. Yet, as CLS stresses, it is exactly this tightrope 
walk, this constant oscillation between an insider and an outsider position, which will make other 
cultures and countries more intelligible. Levi-Strauss’s critical insight into the discovery process is 
driven by genuine curiosity and the will and wish to know more about the other culture; the one the 
social anthropologist is not part of. In the end, Levi-Strauss succeeds because he makes an im-
portant contribution of how to avoid ‘nostrification’; i.e. that those studied are treated and studied 
as if they were on the way to becoming more like ‘us’. In the same vein, Clifford Geertz has stepped 
into Levi-Strauss’ footsteps by asking whether our concepts can still remain unchanged despite a 
world that has radically changed. In the light of the changes we have [our generation has?] seen, 
from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the post-September 11 wars, can we still maintain that country 
and culture are the same and that culture and consensus are identical (Available Light, 2001)? This 
surely must have consequences for any future attempt at comparative analysis. 
This short discussion throws up the ultimate question of whether comparison can be taught; can it 
be acquired in the classroom or in the seminar? Like any good analysis, comparative study worthy 
of the name will have to address what other sociological and historical studies do. In other words, it 
will have to address the famous What, How and Why questions: What exactly is happening? How is 
it happening? And why is it happening? But apart from that, comparative study must also show 
sensibilities towards differences in language, culture and custom. Famously, Marcel Mauss, one of 
the founders of the comparative approach, never travelled and has been denounced as an ‘armchair 
social anthropologist’. But yet it is not necessary to have lived and conducted fieldwork with every 
tribe and nation to achieve intellectual distinction. The answer as to whether the comparative ap-
proach can be taught (and whether there even exists a method that can be called comparative) 
probably lies somewhere in between these two extremes. Let’s start with the obvious. The operation 
called comparison would have a better name if some of its advocates and practitioners would speak 
at least a second or third language, perhaps with a passive knowledge of a few more. The same ap-
plies to academic disciplines; those who only know one probably don’t even know that one very 
well. After all, as the short Benjamin remark that I mentioned in the beginning shows, comparison 
is the foundation of intelligence. 
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